Recent Research

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See below for some recent publications by SoNG’s members:

Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
Against the Bifurcation of Virtue“, forthcoming in Noûs.
The Social Virtue of Blind Deference”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91(3), 2015.
A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism” (with Jeffrey Dunn), Philosophical Quarterly 64(257), 2014.
Getting it Right” (with Stephen Grimm), Philosophical Studies 166(2), 2013.
Moderate Epistemic Expressivism,” Philosophical Studies 163(2), 2013.
In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94(1), 2013.

Anthony Booth
Why Responsible Belief is Permissible Belief,” (with Rik Peels) forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy.
Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons are Not Object-Given Reasons,” forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought,” forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy.
All Things Considered Duties to Believe,” Synthese 187(2), 2012.

Simon Kirchin
Thick Concepts (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Includes “Introduction: Thick and Thin Concepts”, 1-19 and “Thick Concepts and Thick Descriptions”, 60-77.
Evaluation, Normativity and Grounding“, Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 87(1), 2013: 179-198.
Metaethics, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012.
The Shapelessness Hypothesis“, Philosophers’ Imprint 10(4), 2010.
A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Error Theory (ed. with Richard Joyce), Dordrecht: Springer, 2010. Includes “Introduction” (with Richard Joyce), ix-xxiv and “A Tension in the Moral Error Theory”, 167-182.

Conor McHugh
Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency,” Philosophical Issues (forthcoming).
Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation,” Analytic Philosophy (forthcoming).
Exercising Doxastic Freedom,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
The Truth Norm of Belief,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93, 2012.

Richard Pettigrew
“Risk, Rationality, and Expected Utility Theory”, forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
“Transformative experience and decision theory”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91(3), 2015.
“Pluralism about belief states”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supp. Vol.) 89(1), 2015.
“What chance-credence norms should not be”, Noûs 49(1), 2015.
“Accuracy and the belief-credence connection”, Philosophers’ Imprint 15(16), 2015.

Lubomira Radoilska
Addiction and Weakness of Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Autonomy and Mental Disorder (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Jonathan Way
Value and Reasons to Favour,” in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8 (OUP, 2013).
Explaining the Instrumental Principle,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3), September 2012: 487-506.
Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason,” Ethics 122(3), April 2012: 489-515.
The Symmetry of Rational Requirements,” Philosophical Studies 155(2), September 2011: 227-39.

Daniel Whiting
Stick to the Facts: on the Norms of Assertion”, forthcoming in Erkenntnis.
Should I Believe the Truth?”, dialectica 64 (2), 2010: 213-224.
Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90(4), 2009: 535-555.
Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action”, in C. Littlejohn and J. Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion (OUP, forthcoming).

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